Modèles probabilistes en Sciences Cognitives

Neural signals are corrupted by noise and this places limits on information processing. We review the processes involved in goal-directed movements and how neural noise and uncertainty determine aspects of our behaviour. First, noise in sensory signals limits perception. We show that, when localizing our hand, the central nervous system (CNS) integrates visual and proprioceptive information, each with different noise properties, in a way that minimizes the uncertainty in the overall estimate. Second, noise in motor commands leads to inaccurate movements. We review an optimal-control framework, known as 'task optimization in the presence of signal-dependent noise', which assumes that movements are planned so as to minimize the deleterious consequences of noise and thereby minimize inaccuracy. Third, during movement, sensory and motor signals have to be integrated to allow estimation of the body's state. Models are presented that show how these signals are optimally combined. Finally, we review how the CNS deals with noise at the neural and network levels. In all of these processes, the CNS carries out the tasks in such a way that the detrimental effects of noise are minimized. This shows that it is important to consider effects at the neural level in order to understand performance at the behavioural level.

When we learn a new motor skill, such as playing an approaching tennis ball, both our sensors and the task possess variability. Our sensors provide imperfect information about the ball's velocity, so we can only estimate it. Combining information from multiple modalities can reduce the error in this estimate. On a longer time scale, not all velocities are a priori equally probable, and over the course of a match there will be a probability distribution of velocities. According to bayesian theory, an optimal estimate results from combining information about the distribution of velocities-the prior-with evidence from sensory feedback. As uncertainty increases, when playing in fog or at dusk, the system should increasingly rely on prior knowledge. To use a bayesian strategy, the brain would need to represent the prior distribution and the level of uncertainty in the sensory feedback. Here we control the statistical variations of a new sensorimotor task and manipulate the uncertainty of the sensory feedback. We show that subjects internally represent both the statistical distribution of the task and their sensory uncertainty, combining them in a manner consistent with a performance-optimizing bayesian process. The central nervous system therefore employs probabilistic models during sensorimotor learning.

The recent flowering of Bayesian approaches invites the re-examination of classic issues in behavior, even in areas as venerable as Pavlovian conditioning. A statistical account can offer a new, principled interpretation of behavior, and previous experiments and theories can inform many unexplored aspects of the Bayesian enterprise. Here we consider one such issue: the finding that surprising events provoke animals to learn faster. We suggest that, in a statistical account of conditioning, surprise signals change and therefore uncertainty and the need for new learning. We discuss inference in a world that changes and show how experimental results involving surprise can be interpreted from this perspective, and also how, thus understood, these phenomena help constrain statistical theories of animal and human learning.

We argue that the study of human vision should be aimed at determining how humans perform natural tasks with natural images. Attempts to understand the phenomenology of vision from artificial stimuli, although worthwhile as a starting point, can lead to faulty generalizations about visual systems, because of the enormous complexity of natural images. Dealing with this complexity is daunting, but Bayesian inference on structured probability distributions offers the ability to design theories of vision that can deal with the complexity of natural images, and that use `analysis by synthesis' strategies with intriguing similarities to the brain. We examine these strategies using recent examples from computer vision, and outline some important imlications for cognitive science.

Inductive inference allows humans to make powerful generalizations from sparse data when learning about word meanings, unobserved properties, causal relationships, and many other aspects of the world. Traditional accounts of induction emphasize either the power of statistical learning, or the importance of strong constraints from structured domain knowledge, intuitive theories or schemas. We argue that both components are necessary to explain the nature, use and acquisition of human knowledge, and we introduce a theory-based Bayesian framework for modeling inductive learning and reasoning as statistical inferences over structured knowledge representations.

Action selection is a fundamental decision process for us, and depends on the state of both our body and the environment. Because signals in our sensory and motor systems are corrupted by variability or noise, the nervous system needs to estimate these states. To select an optimal action these state estimates need to be combined with knowledge of the potential costs or rewards of different action outcomes. We review recent studies that have investigated the mechanisms used by the nervous system to solve such estimation and decision problems, which show that human behaviour is close to that predicted by Bayesian Decision Theory. This theory defines optimal behaviour in a world characterized by uncertainty, and provides a coherent way of describing sensorimotor processes.

The idea of viewing human cognition as a rational solution to computational problems posed by the environment has influenced several recent theories of human memory. The first rational models of memory demonstrated that human memory seems to be remarkably well adapted to environmental statistics but made only minimal assumptions about the form of the environmental information represented in memory. Recently, several probabilistic methods for representing the latent semantic structure of language have been developed, drawing on research in computer science, statistics and computational linguistics. These methods provide a means of extending rational models of memory retrieval to linguistic stimuli, and a way to explore the influence of the statistics of language on human memory.

Probabilistic methods are providing new explanatory approaches to fundamental cognitive science questions of how humans structure, process and acquire language. This review examines probabilistic models defined over traditional symbolic structures. Language comprehension and production involve probabilistic inference in such models; and acquisition involves choosing the best model, given innate constraints and linguistic and other input. Probabilistic models can account for the learning and processing of language, while maintaining the sophistication of symbolic models. A recent burgeoning of theoretical developments and online corpus creation has enabled large models to be tested, revealing probabilistic constraints in processing, undermining acquisition arguments based on a perceived poverty of the stimulus, and suggesting fruitful links with probabilistic theories of categorization and ambiguity resolution in perception.